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The desire to seek new and unfamiliar experiences is
a fundamental behavioral tendency in humans and
other species. In economic decision making, novelty
seeking is often rational, insofar as uncertain options
may prove valuable and advantageous in the long
run. Here, we show that, even when the degree of
perceptual familiarity of an option is unrelated to
choice outcome, novelty nevertheless drives choice
behavior. Using functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI), we show that this behavior is specifi-
cally associated with striatal activity, in a manner
consistent with computational accounts of decision
making under uncertainty. Furthermore, this activity
predicts interindividual differences in susceptibility
to novelty. These data indicate that the brain uses
perceptual novelty to approximate choice uncer-
tainty in decision making, which in certain contexts
gives rise to a newly identified and quantifiable
source of human irrationality.
INTRODUCTION
Humans and other animals are naturally inquisitive and, in many
circumstances, have a characteristic tendency to explore novel
and unfamiliar stimuli and environments (Daffner et al., 1998; En-
naceur and Delacour, 1988; Hughes, 2007). Indeed, this ten-
dency is exploited in marketing strategies whereby manufac-
turers of everyday consumable goods regularly remarket
identical, or near-identical, products with novel packaging or ad-
vertising (Steenkamp and Gielens, 2003). Consumers’ vulnera-
bility to such manipulation may reflect the fact that, in naturalistic
environments, novelty seeking can be strongly adaptive: be-
cause unfamiliarity normally tends to imply uncertainty, subse-
quent exploration carries with it the opportunity to discover un-
known and potentially valuable outcomes.
Economic and computational models have formalized the
adaptive value of information gathering, and, equally important,
how this can be traded off against the substantial costs and risks
entailed. A fully rational solution (in the sense of maximizing ex-pected utility; e.g., Sanfey et al., 2006) quantifies the value of
exploration in terms of uncertainty reduction and the beneficial
effects of this knowledge on future choices (Gittins and Jones,
1974). In practice, this optimal approach is computationally labo-
rious, and researchers in robotics and computer science have
often employed a shortcut that encourages exploratory behavior
in artificial agents by assigning a fictive ‘‘bonus’’ reward value to
novel options (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2003; Gittins and
Jones, 1974; Kaelbling, 1993; Ng et al., 1999), that is, by treating
novel stimuli as themselves rewarding. Here, we investigate the
possibility that human brains employ a similar heuristic. Note that
insofar as novelty does not perfectly signal an unknown option—
as with the example of repackaged goods—this approach de-
parts from that prescribed by a rational analysis, for instance
by exploring unnecessarily.
The idea that novelty engages brain systems involved in appe-
titive reinforcement learning is supported by evidence that novel
stimuli excite dopaminergic neurons in animals and also activate
putatively dopaminergic areas in humans (Bunzeck and Duzel,
2006; Horvitz, 2000; Schultz, 1998). Computational theorists
have interpreted these findings in terms of novelty bonuses (Ka-
kade and Dayan, 2002). Furthermore, in a novelty paradigm
modeled after classical conditioning procedures (Wittmann
et al., 2007), a familiar cue trained to predict subsequent novelty
itself activated midbrain, a response pattern that is reminiscent
of dopaminergic responses to cues predicting reward as well
as being characteristic of reinforcement learning (Dayan and Bal-
leine, 2002; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000).
These data suggest that stimulus novelty might enhance ex-
ploratory choices in humans through engagement of circuits
within a putative reward system, which encompasses midbrain,
striatum, amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, and mesial prefrontal
cortex (cf. Knutson and Cooper, 2005). Nevertheless, despite
this strong suggestive evidence, no functional links have been
demonstrated between a biological ‘‘novelty bonus’’ signal and
actual novelty-seeking behavior.
To investigate these links, we studied novelty-related decision
making and associated brain activity in 15 healthy adults using
functional magnetic resonance brain imaging (fMRI). We sought
to test a computational hypothesis that brain systems associ-
ated with choice behavior, which are well described within
reinforcement learning models, use novelty bonuses to encour-
age exploration of unfamiliar options. Participants performedNeuron 58, 967–973, June 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 967
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Striatum Codes Novelty-Based Choice in HumansFigure 1. Experimental Design
Following a familiarization phase, participants were shown four pictures on each trial and asked to choose one. Both familiarized and novel pictures were pre-
sented at randomized locations that changed on each trial. Each picture was repeated for an average of 20 trials and then replaced. Participants were informed
that each picture had been assigned a unique probability of winning £1 that would not change as long as that picture was repeated. They were given feedback at
the end of each trial indicating whether they had won or received nothing.a ‘‘four-armed bandit’’ choice task, in which the options were
represented by four simultaneously presented landscape (‘‘post-
card’’) images per trial (Figure 1). Each image, repeated over an
average of 20 trials, was associated with a random, constant
probability of winning money (one pound sterling). It was then
replaced with another image with a new payoff probability.
Subjects could only discover an option’s reward probability by
repeatedly sampling it, inducing a classic exploration/exploita-
tion dilemma for subjects striving to maximize their earnings.
Critically, we manipulated the novelty of images independently
of reward value and uncertainty by familiarizing the subjects
with half of the pictures (though not their associated reward
probabilities) in a separate task before the scanning session.
The images then used in the choice task were drawn pseudoran-
domly from the pre-exposed and novel sets; the associated pay-
off probabilities were also allocated pseudorandomly but with
the same distribution for each set. This design ensures that novel
options are no more uncertain, nor on average more valuable,
than familiarized ones, allowing us specifically to examine a




We fit participants’ choices using a temporal-difference learning
model (Sutton and Barto, 1998) similar to those used to account
for choice behavior and neural signals in previous studies (Daw
et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006; Tanaka et al., 2004). The model as-
sumes that participants learn the value of each option and direct
their choices toward those options predicted to be most valu-
able. In similar algorithms in artificial intelligence, novelty bo-
nuses are often incorporated by ‘‘optimistically’’ initializing the
starting value of new options to a higher level, encouraging ex-
ploration to determine their true value (Brafman and Tennen-
holtz, 2003; Ng et al., 1999).
To test for such bonuses, we included two parameters, repre-
senting the initial value attributed to novel and prefamiliarized
pictures. The best-fitting parameters over subjects are shown
in Table 1. We first tested whether this model accounted better
for the subjects’ choices than a simpler model that initialized
both sets of pictures with the best shared initial value; it did (likeli-968 Neuron 58, 967–973, June 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.hood ratio test, 15 d.f., p < 0.005). Adopting the model with sep-
arate initial values, we found that novelty significantly enhanced
exploration, as evidenced by the fact that, for the best-fitting
parameters, the average expected value attributed to novel
pictures (Qn) on their first introduction was significantly higher
than the corresponding expected value for familiar pictures (Qf;
mean Qn = 0.41 ± 0.076 pounds over subjects; mean Qf = 0.37 ±
0.071 pounds; paired t test p = 0.01). Put simply, this quantified
the monetary value of novelty at approximately 4 pence.
Average reaction time (RT) for all choices was 1458 ± 80 ms.
RTs did not differ between novel and familiar stimuli chosen on
the trial when they were first introduced (1692 ± 110 ms and
1774 ± 126 ms, respectively). Scores on the novelty-seeking
subscale of the TPQ ranged from 24% to 69% of the maximal
score (mean = 52% ± SE 3.4). Individual participants’ novelty bo-
nuses, measured as a fraction relative to Qf, i.e., (Qn - Qf)/Qf,
ranged from 0.17 to 0.53 (mean = 0.12 ± SE 0.05).
Striatal Reward and Novelty Signals
In terms of brain activity, we hypothesized that novelty bonuses
would affect ‘‘prediction error’’ signals believed to influence
learned value prediction and choice (Kakade and Dayan, 2002;
McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Pessiglione et al.,
2006; Schultz, 1998; Tobler et al., 2006). To formally test this in
our neuroimaging data (using SPM5), we ran two versions of
the model to generate trial-by-trial prediction error signals for
each subject. The first version was the novelty bonus model de-
scribed above, while the second model applied the initial value of
familiar stimuli to all stimuli, thus eliminating any impact of a nov-
elty bonus. This second version was used to identify brain re-
gions responding to a standard prediction error, and the
Table 1. Parameter Estimates for the Behavioral Model, Shown
as Mean (Over Subjects) ± 1 SE
Learning rate n 0.23 ± 0.038
Softmax inv. temperature b 8.5 ± 1.2
Initial value, familiarized Qf 0.37 ± 0.071
Initial value, novel Qn 0.41 ± 0.076
Due to poor identification of b and n, one subject is omitted from these
averages.
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Striatum Codes Novelty-Based Choice in HumansFigure 2. Ventral Striatal Response to
Prediction Error and Novelty
Peak coordinates are given in MNI space on all im-
ages. Color bars indicate T values.
(A) Activation in right ventral striatum correlated
significantly with reward prediction errors gener-
ated by the standard TD model (p < 0.001 uncor-
rected, p < 0.05 SVC, cluster > 5 voxels).
(B) Activation in right ventral striatum correlated
significantly with additional prediction error due
to inclusion of a novelty bonus (p < 0.001 uncor-
rected, p < 0.05 SVC, cluster > 5 voxels).
(C) Significant overlap between activation in right
ventral striatum for the novelty bonus (see [B])
and activation obtained for standard model (see
[A]) derived by inclusively masking (B) with (A)
(p < 0.005, uncorrected, for both contrasts, clus-
ter > 5 voxels).
(D) Striatal activation time courses calculated for
the first two trials a novel stimulus is chosen minus
the first two choices of familiar stimuli, shown
for the peak voxel correlating with the novelty
bonus (MNI coordinates: 14, 20, 10). Trials are
aligned by the time of reward outcome at 6.5 s;
the average stimulus onset time is also indicated.
Error bars indicate SEM.difference between both prediction errors was then used to char-
acterize areas in which neural activity was additionally correlated
with a further error due to the novelty bonus. If neuronal predic-
tion error activity is influenced by novelty bonuses, then it follows
that it should correlate in the same brain area with both signals.
We confined our analyses to ventral striatum and midbrain areas
corresponding to our prior hypothesis (Kakade and Dayan,
2002).
Anticipation of reward has been shown to be associated with
striatal activity in both active and passive tasks (Aron et al., 2004;
Berns et al., 2001; Delgado, 2007; Knutson et al., 2000; Pagnoni
et al., 2002; Samejima et al., 2005; Tanaka et al., 2004; Yacubian
et al., 2007), a response that is correlated with prediction errors
determined in temporal-difference learning models (Daw et al.,
2006; McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Rodriguez
et al., 2006). Consistent with these findings, the standard predic-
tion error generated by assuming identical initial expected values
for novel and familiar stimuli correlated with activity in the ventral
striatum (Figure 2A). Additionally, the component of prediction
error due to the novelty bonus also correlated significantly with
ventral striatal activity (Figure 2B). Figure 2C shows the signifi-
cant overlap in the spatial expression of both activation maps.
This finding is consistent with the computational model, which
predicts that the full error signal is the sum of both components.
Time courses from the peak voxel correlating with the bonus sig-
nal (Figure 2D) illustrate that the response to choice of novel (rel-
ative to familiarized) pictures has a biphasic shape. Note that
a similar pattern is seen in the responses of dopaminergic neu-
rons to novel stimuli in tasks not involving reward (Horvitzet al., 1997; Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Schultz, 1998) and is char-
acteristic of the novelty bonus scheme in prediction error
models, because more optimistic predictions lead to more neg-
ative prediction error when the actual reward is revealed.
Measures of Individual Novelty Seeking
Finally, we reasoned that, if the identified striatal neural signals
are indeed involved in novelty-seeking behavior, then we would
also expect them to track interparticipant variability in this trait.
Accordingly, we investigated whether the strength of the neural
novelty bonus correlated with two behavioral measures of indi-
vidual differences in novelty seeking. First, participants with
higher novelty bonuses determined through model fits to their
behavior in our task showed stronger novelty-bonus-related ac-
tivation of the right ventral striatum and midbrain than did partic-
ipants with lower behavioral novelty bonuses (Figure 3). By
masking this analysis anatomically within the area activated on
average by the novelty bonus in the group (Figure 2B), we verified
that the striatal modulation of this activation indeed lies within the
same region. Also, individual scores on the novelty-seeking sub-
scale of Cloninger’s Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire
(TPQ) correlated with the degree of novelty-bonus activity in
the left ventral striatum (see Figure S1 available online). These
modulations (and the midbrain correlation with novelty seeking
from the choice fits) lie outside the mask generated from the
novelty-bonus group average but within areas that are known
to be involved in reward and novelty processing (Wittmann
et al., 2007, 2005). As predicted, there was no correlation of
striatal or midbrain novelty signals with the harm-avoidanceNeuron 58, 967–973, June 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 969
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Striatum Codes Novelty-Based Choice in HumansFigure 3. Individual Variation in Novelty Response
Areas in which the level of activation by novelty bonus signal correlated
significantly with individual subject measures of novelty seeking (p <
0.005 uncorrected, p < 0.05 SVC, cluster > 5 voxels). Peak coordinates
are given in MNI space on all images. Color bars indicate T values.
(A) Activation in right ventral striatum correlating with individual novelty
seeking as measured in the behavioral task. Image is masked by ‘‘novelty
bonus’’ contrast image from Figure 2B.
(B) Peak beta values from (A) plotted against individual novelty-seeking
measures.
(C) Activation in right substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area correlating
with individual novelty seeking as measured in the behavioral task, super-
imposed on a magnetization transfer image for better visualization of the
substantia nigra (Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006). Image is masked by ‘‘novelty
bonus’’ contrast image from Figure 2B. Substantia nigra is indicated by
green circles.
(D) Peak beta values from (C) plotted against individual novelty-seeking
measures.and reward-dependence subscales of the TPQ and no correla-
tion of activations for the base component of the prediction error
with any of the novelty-seeking measures.
DISCUSSION
Our data show that novelty enhances behavioral exploration in
humans in the context of an appetitive reinforcement learning
task. Participants’ actual choices were best captured in a model
that introduced higher initial values for novel stimuli than for pre-
familiarized stimuli. This computationally defined novelty bonus
was associated with activation of ventral striatum, suggesting
that exploration of novelty shares properties with reward pro-
cessing. Specifically, the observed overlap of novelty-related
and reward-related neural components of prediction error sig-
nals supports this interpretation. The observation that activation
by novelty bonuses in both striatal and midbrain areas correlated
with individual novelty-seeking scores points to a functional con-
tribution of the mesolimbic system to novelty-related enhance-
ment of choice behavior.
All of these findings are consistent with a specific computa-
tional and neural mechanism (Kakade and Dayan, 2002), namely
that a dopaminergic prediction error signal for reinforcement
learning reports a novelty bonus encouraging exploration.
Such a model had been originally advanced to explain dopami-
nergic neuron responses to novel stimuli in passive, nondecision
tasks (Horvitz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998), a response pattern that
has also been suggested in humans (Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006;
Wittmann et al., 2007). By linking a bonus-related neural signal to
actual novelty-seeking behavior, the present study provides ev-
idence to support a model of dopamine-driven novelty explora-
tion. While it is not possible to identify definitively the neural
source underlying fMRI signals, recent results support an infer-
ence that striatal prediction error signals have a dopaminergic
basis, because they are modulated by dopaminergic drugs (Pes-
siglione et al., 2006; Yacubian et al., 2006). Also, given that fMRI970 Neuron 58, 967–973, June 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.does not allow inference of causality from correlations of brain
activity with behavior, alternative explanations for our findings
are possible. For instance, areas outside of the mesolimbic sys-
tem could mediate the exploration effect of novelty, and the stria-
tal activations might then reflect these choices. However, in di-
rectly contrasting exploratory to exploitative choices (as in
Daw et al., 2006), we did not find novelty- or exploration-related
activity in frontopolar cortex, a candidate region outside the mid-
brain (Daw et al., 2006).
Computational models stress the necessity to overcome ex-
ploitative tendencies in order to optimize decision making under
uncertainty (Gittins and Jones, 1974). One solution to this is the
introduction of an exploration bonus to guide decisions toward
uncertain options (Gittins and Jones, 1974; Kaelbling, 1993).
Here, we provide evidence for a specific version of such a bonus
that uses novelty as a signal for uncertainty (Brafman and Ten-
nenholtz, 2003; Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Ng et al., 1999). Nota-
bly, a bonus directed toward uncertainty per se was not evident,
either neurally or behaviorally, in a previous study of gambling in-
volving an n-armed bandit task, in which uncertainty arose due to
a gradual change in the unknown payoffs but without accompa-
nying perceptual novelty (Daw et al., 2006). The differences be-
tween the tasks may explain why, in the previous study but not
the present one, exploratory choices were found to be accompa-
nied by BOLD activity in frontopolar cortex, a region broadly as-
sociated with cognitive control. Psychologically, exploration in
a familiar context, as in the earlier study, requires overriding
not only a tendency to exploit known highly rewarding stimuli
but also a tendency to avoid previously low-valued stimuli. How-
ever, novel options, like those used here, may not only be attrac-
tive due to a novelty bonus, but crucially have no history of neg-
ative feedback, perhaps reducing the demand for cognitive
control to encourage their exploration.
Computationally, the present findings point to the likelihood
that humans use perceptual novelty as a substitute for true
choice uncertainty in directing exploration. This would explain
Neuron
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options even when no more uncertain and also why our previous
study (Daw et al., 2006) did not detect exploration directed to-
ward uncertainty without perceptual novelty. Such a scheme is
common in artificial intelligence (Brafman and Tennenholtz,
2003; Ng et al., 1999), because it is so easily implemented by op-
timistic initialization. Additionally, it seems to be a plausible neu-
ral shortcut, because novelty is likely to be a reliable signal for un-
certainty in the natural world. Physiologically, this appears to be
implemented by using the same system to process the motiva-
tional aspects of standard reward.
To be sure, on a rational analysis, the degree to which explo-
ration is net beneficial depends on a number of circumstantial
factors, including for instance how dangerous unexplored alter-
natives are likely to be. Computationally, this points to an impor-
tant requirement that the degree of novelty seeking needs to be
carefully tuned to appropriate levels (there are some proposals
for the neural substrates for similar ‘‘metalearning’’ processes;
Doya, 2002). Behaviorally, this point resonates with the fact
that animals’ novelty preferences exhibit a great deal of subtle
contextual sensitivity (Hughes, 2007). Rats, for instance, avoid
novel foods (presumably due to serious risk of illness), and
fear-promoting stimuli such as electric shocks can also promote
novelty avoidance on some tasks. Such phenomena are not in-
consistent with our account of novelty seeking in the present
(safe) context; indeed, we would infer that our approach could
easily be extended to quantify the effects of factors such as fear.
Finally, while the novelty bonus may be a useful and computa-
tionally efficient heuristic in naturalistic environments, it clearly
has a downside. In humans, increased novelty seeking is associ-
ated with gambling and addiction (Hiroi and Agatsuma, 2005;
Spinella, 2003), disorders that are also closely linked to dopami-
nergic pathophysiology (Chau et al., 2004; Reuter et al., 2005).
More generally, the substitution of perceptual novelty for choice
uncertainty represents a distinct, albeit slight, departure from ra-
tional choice that, as in our task, introduces the danger of being
sold old wine in a new skin.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Twenty healthy adults participated in the experiment, four of which had to be
excluded for technical problems with stimulus presentation and scanner se-
quence software and another for electing to leave the experiment before it
was complete. Fifteen right-handed participants (mean age, 26.1 ± 1.2; seven
male) remained in the analysis. All participants gave written informed consent




Prior to scanning, participants underwent two familiarization sessions that in-
cluded 32 pictures from a set of 64 grayscale landscape photographs with nor-
malized luminance and contrast. Each picture was presented four times per
session in randomized order. In the first session, participants were asked to
look at the pictures attentively without responding, while in the second session
they were asked to respond to each picture per button press, indicating
whether there was a building in the picture.
Prescanning
Participants received written instructions on the decision-making task, includ-
ing the information that they would receive 20% of their winnings at the end ofthe experiment. They also completed a short button response training to en-
sure that their responses reflected their choices and a short training version
of the task (Figure 1).
Scanning Task
Participants engaged in three sessions of 17.5 min length, each containing 100
trials of 8.5–11.5 s duration. On each trial, participants were presented with
four pictures (visible on a screen reflected in a head coil mirror) and selected
one depending on its location on the screen (top left, top right, bottom left, bot-
tom right), using a button box with their right hand. If they did not choose a pic-
ture within 3.5 s, the feedback ‘‘No response’’ was presented on the screen for
6.5 s to signal an invalid trial. On valid trials, a frame was shown around the
chosen picture, and feedback (£1 on a green square background or £0 on
a blue square background) was presented 3 s later, superimposed on the cho-
sen picture. A variable fixation phase (1–4 s) followed. Participants received ei-
ther £1 or nothing, depending on the reward probability associated with the
chosen picture. Each picture had been assigned a random reward probability
(mean value: 0.33) that was not changed in the course of the experiment.
Each picture was repeated for an average of 20 trials (range: 5–35). The lo-
cation of pictures was changed randomly on each trial, so that a decision could
not be based on habitual responding with the same finger. In 20% of trials, one
of the pictures was exchanged for another picture that had either been famil-
iarized or was novel (=30 switches to either category in total).
After scanning, participants completed Cloninger’s Tridimensional Person-
ality Questionnaire (Cloninger et al., 1991), which tests for personality differ-
ences in three dimensions defined as novelty seeking, reward dependence,
and harm avoidance.
Behavioral Analysis
We characterized each subject’s trial-to-trial choices using a temporal-differ-
ence learning model with four free parameters. The model assumes that the
probability of choosing picture c (out of the four available options) on trial t is
PðcðtÞ= c; tÞfexpðb,Qðc; tÞÞ; that is, softmax in Qðc; tÞ, the presumed value
of the option on that trial. The inverse temperature parameter b controls the ex-
clusivity with which choices are directed toward higher-valued options.
According to the model, the values Q were learned from experience using
a standard delta rule, QðcðtÞ; t + 1Þ=QðcðtÞ; tÞ+ n,dðtÞ. Here, the value of the
chosen option is updated according to the error signal dðtÞ= rðtÞ  QðcðtÞ; tÞ,
which measures the mismatch between the reward delivered, rðtÞ (i.e., 1 or 0)
and the value expected. n is a learning rate parameter (values for options not
chosen were not changed).
The initial values of each picture, Qðc; 0Þ, are set to Qf (a free parameter) if
the picture had been pre-exposed during the familiarization phase, and to pa-
rameter Qn if not. The difference Qn  Qf therefore confers differential initial
value for non-pre-exposed pictures when first presented; if this difference is
positive (a ‘‘novelty bonus’’; Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Ng et al., 1999), it favors
the choice of novel items when they first become available.
We optimized the parameters for each subject individually to maximize the




the underlying values Qðc; tÞ were computed using the model and the preced-
ing sequence of actual observed choices cð1.t  1Þ and rewards rð1.t  1Þ.
We also, separately, fit a nested model in with the initial values constrained to
be equal, i.e., Qn =Qf , and compared the two models on the entire data set
(pooled over all subjects) using a likelihood ratio test.
The best-fitting estimates for each parameter were then treated as a random
variable instantiated for each subject (equivalently, we treated all parameters
as random effects and estimated the moments of the group distribution using
the summary statistics procedure [Holmes and Friston, 1998]). Because of
a degeneracy in the model in some regimes (specifically, when n is very small
and consequently the Qs are consistently very far from asymptote), it was not
possible to obtain reliable parameter estimates for one subject, who was
therefore excluded from the estimates of the average parameters. Because
the degeneracy manifests through poorly constrained but at the optimum ab-
errantly large and small (respectively) values of b and n, the exclusion or inclu-
sion of this subject had no appreciable effect on the reported hypothesis tests
involving Qf and Qn, or on the model comparison.
To generate model-based regressors for the imaging analysis, the learning
model was simulated using each subject’s actual sequence of rewards andNeuron 58, 967–973, June 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 971
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ror signals dðtÞ. The free parameters were taken to be top-level mean estimates
from the random-effects model (i.e., the mean of the individual parameter es-
timates; this regularizes the individual estimates, which we have previously
found to be noisy for these purposes, e.g., Daw et al., 2006).
To study the effects of the novelty bonus on the prediction error, we re-
peated the simulations, but taking Qn =Qf—that is, eliminating any bonus for
non-pre-exposed pictures. This generated a second sequence of values
Qbaseðc; tÞ and prediction errors dbaseðtÞ, reflecting baseline values without
the additional effects of the novelty bonus. For the purpose of regression,
we decomposed the values Qðc; tÞ and dðtÞ into the sums
Qbaseðc; tÞ+Qaddðc; tÞ and dbaseðtÞ+ daddðtÞ of the baseline values plus addi-
tional increments for the effects of the bonus. We computed
QaddðtÞ=QðtÞ QbaseðtÞ and daddðtÞ= dðtÞ  dbaseðtÞ. Together with a standard
general linear analysis, this additive decomposition allowed us to study the
contribution of baseline and bonus-related components of the prediction error
signal to BOLD activity and to test the hypothesis that both components sum-
mate to produce the full error signal. Note that the bonus has a characteristic
pattern of effects on the values and errors, which is not wholly confined (for in-
stance) only to trials when a novel picture is first offered. For instance, if Qn>Qf
then Qadd>0 and dadd<0 whenever a nonfamiliarized option is chosen.
fMRI Procedures
The functional imaging was conducted using a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Sonata MRI
scanner to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPI) with
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast. We employed a special
sequence designed to optimize functional sensitivity in OFC and medial tem-
poral lobes. This consisted of tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation at 30*
to the AC-PC line, as well as application of a preparation pulse with a duration
of 1 ms and amplitude of 2 mT/m in the slice selection direction. The se-
quence enabled 36 axial slices of 3 mm thickness and 3 mm in-plane resolution
to be acquired with a repetition time (TR) of 3.24 s. Coverage was obtained
from the base of the orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes to the su-
perior border of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. A field map using a double
echo FLASH sequence (64 oblique transverse slices, slice thickness = 2 mm,
gap between slices = 1 mm, TR = 1170 ms, a = 90, short TE = 10 ms, long
TE = 14.76 ms, BW = 260 Hz/pixel, PE direction anterior-posterior, FOV =
192 3 192 mm2, matrix size 64 3 64, flow compensation) was recorded for
distortion correction of the acquired EPI images. Participants were placed in
a light head restraint within the scanner to limit head movement during acqui-
sition. Functional imaging data were acquired in three separate 332 volume
runs. A T1-weighted structural image, local field maps, and an inversion recov-
ery EPI (IR-EPI) were also acquired for each subject. Scanning parameters
were the same as for the EPI sequence but with full brain coverage.
fMRI Analysis
Preprocessing and data analysis were performed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping software implemented in Matlab (SPM5; Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Using the Field-
Map toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002, 2004), field maps were estimated from the
phase difference between the images acquired at the short and long TE. The
EPI images were corrected for distortions based on the field map (Hutton
et al., 2002) and the interaction of motion and distortion using the Unwarp tool-
box (Andersson et al., 2001; Hutton et al., 2004). EPI images were then spatially
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute template by warping the sub-
ject’s anatomical IR-EPI to the SPM template and applying these parameters
to the functional images, transforming them into 2 3 2 3 2 mm sized voxels,
smoothed using an 8 mm Gaussian kernel.
For statistical analysis, the data were scaled voxel-by-voxel onto their global
mean and high-pass filtered. Each trial was modeled with impulse regressors
at two time points: the time of the presentation of the pictures, which was taken
to be the time of the decision, and the time of presentation of the outcome (3 s
after key press). These events were modulated by parametric regressors sim-
ulating the baseline prediction error signal and the additional component to the
error due to the novelty bonus. The baseline prediction error was defined as
QbaseðcðtÞ; tÞ at the time the pictures were presented on trial t (Morris et al.,972 Neuron 58, 967–973, June 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.2006) and as dbaseðtÞ at the time the outcome was revealed. The novelty bonus
contribution was modeled as QaddðcðtÞ; tÞ and daddðtÞ at the same time points.
These regressors were then convolved with the canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function and its temporal derivative (Friston et al., 1998) and entered as
separate orthogonalized regressors into one regression analysis against each
subject’s fMRI data using SPM, allowing independent assessment of the acti-
vations correlating with each model’s predictions. The six scan-to-scan mo-
tion parameters produced during realignment were included as additional re-
gressors in the SPM analysis to account for residual effects of scan-to-scan
motion. To enable inference at the group level, the coefficient estimates for
the two model-based regressors from each individual subject were taken to al-
low second-level, random-effects group statistics to be computed. To inves-
tigate how individual variation in novelty seeking impacted bonus-related
BOLD activity, we included the normalized per-subject novelty bonus (Qn 
Qf)/Qf (computed using the individual estimates of these parameters from
the behavioral analysis) as a second-level regressor.
Results are reported in areas of interest at p < 0.001 uncorrected. The pre-
dicted activations in the ventral striatum were further tested using a spherical
small-volume correction (SVC) centered on the peak voxel, with a radius of
9 mm, corresponding to the 3.43 cm3 volume of the putamen (Anastasi
et al., 2006). All behavioral averages are given as mean values ± SE. To better
localize midbrain activity, the relevant activation maps were superimposed on
a mean image of 33 spatially normalized magnetization transfer (MT) images
acquired previously (Bunzeck and Duzel, 2006). On MT images, the substantia
nigra can be easily distinguished from surrounding structures (Eckert et al.,
2004).
To illustrate time courses, we conducted an additional regression analysis
on the voxel of peak activation for the bonus regressor using a flexible basis
set of 1 TR duration finite impulse responses. Impulses were aligned according
to the time of outcome reveal. Four trial types were modeled separately: the
first two choices of a novel image, the first two trials of a familiar image, and
(as effects of no interest) the remaining trials divided into two groups according
to win versus loss.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
The Supplemental Data for this article, which include tables and figures, can be
found online at http://www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/58/6/967/DC1/.
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